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**Exploring the Nature of Indirect Speech Acts****A B S T R A C T**

Indirect speaking actions are fundamental aspects of human communication, allowing individuals to convey meanings that go beyond the literal interpretation of their words. This abstract aims to provide an overview of indirect speech acts, their nature, and their significance in linguistic research. Indirect speech acts refer to instances where the intended meaning of a speaker's utterance differs from the literal interpretation. This phenomenon occurs when speakers use linguistic expressions that have conventional meanings, but their intended illocutionary force is different. Understanding indirect speech acts requires an examination of both the linguistic forms used and the context in which they are employed. Indirect speech acts offer a versatile and nuanced means of communication, frequently used in scenarios where social conventions or politeness norms come into play. For example, a speaker might employ an indirect speech act to make a request indirectly, soften a criticism, or convey sarcasm. The speaker relies on the listener's ability to derive the intended meanings based on contextual clues and shared cultural understandings. The study of indirect speech acts has gained prominence in pragmatics and sociolinguistics, as researchers aim to uncover the underlying mechanisms and social functions of these communicative phenomena. Investigating indirect speech acts involves examining various factors, including the speaker's intentions, the listener's interpretation, and the contextual framework within which the interaction occurs. This abstract highlights the importance of understanding indirect speech acts for effective communication. By examining the pragmatic aspects of language use beyond literal meaning, researchers and language learners can gain insights into the complexities of human interaction. Improved comprehension of indirect speech acts contributes to more accurate interpretation across linguistic and cultural boundaries.

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استكشاف طبيعة الأفعال اللفظية غير المباشرة

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المستخلص:

تعد الأفعال اللفظية غير المباشرة جزءاً أساسياً من التواصل البشري، حيث تسمح للأفراد بتوصيل معاني تتجاوز التفسير الحرفي لكلماتهم. يهدف هذا الملخص إلى توفير نظرة عامة على الأفعال اللفظية غير المباشرة وطبيعتها وأهميتها في البحوث اللغوية. تشير الأفعال اللفظية غير المباشرة إلى الحالات التي يختلف المعنى المقصود من عبارة المتحدث عن التفسير الحرفي. تحدث هذه الظاهرة عندما يستخدم المتحدثون تعبيرات لغوية تحمل معاني تقليدية، ولكن القوة الفعلية المقصودة بها تختلف. يتطلب فهم الأفعال اللفظية غير المباشرة دراسة كل من الأشكال اللغوية المستخدمة والسياق الذي يتم استخدامها فيه. توفر الأفعال اللفظية غير المباشرة وسائل متعددة الاستخدامات ومعقدة للتواصل، وتستخدم في كثير من الأحيان في السيناريوهات التي تتداخل فيها معايير اجتماعية أو ضوابط اللباقة. على سبيل المثال، قد يستخدم المتحدث فعل لفظي غير مباشر لطلب شيء بشكل غير مباشر، أو لتخفيف الانتقاد، أو للتعبير عن السخرية. يعتمد المتحدث على قدرة المستمع على استنتاج المعنى المقصود بناءً على الإشارات السياقية والمعرفة الثقافية المشتركة. لقد اكتسبت دراسة الأفعال اللفظية غير المباشرة أهمية في علم البراغماتيات وعلم اللغة الاجتماعي، حيث يهدف الباحثون إلى كشف الأسس والوظائف الاجتماعية لهذه الظواهر التواصلية. ينطوي استكشاف الأفعال اللفظية غير المباشرة على دراسة عوامل مختلفة، بما في ذلك نوايا المتحدث، وتفسير المستمع، والسياق الإطاري الذي يحدث فيه التفاعل. يسلط هذا الملخص الضوء على أهمية فهم الأفعال اللفظية غير المباشرة للتواصل الفعال من خلال دراسة الجوانب البراغماتية لاستخدام اللغة في ما وراء المعنى الحرفي، يساهم فهم الأفعال اللفظية غير المباشرة في تحسين التفسير الدقيق والتواصل عبر الحواجز اللغوية والثقافية المتنوعة.

الكلمات المفتاحية: الأفعال اللفظية غير المباشرة، الإشارة المحادثية، القوة الكلامية، النية، استنتاج الخطة، الجوانب الواقعية في السياق.

1. Introduction

The present paper addresses a number of speech act-related issues, focusing on indirect speech actions. It is demonstrated how the metaphysics of action and a formal semantic theory of discourse interpretation may be utilized to describe speech acts. This essay defines indirect speech acts and places a strong emphasis on similarities between lexical and speech act-level phenomena.

In recent years, there has been significant focus on the subject of indirect speech acts, which refers to utterances where a single act of speech conveys a different speech acting. As an example of this case is when a question is asked with the intention of making a request, such as "Can you close the door?" Despite the amount of research conducted on indirect speech acts, Unanswered basic questions continue to exist. One of the basic questions that lacks a complete answer is which forms can be used to realize a specific speech act. The

complexity of indirect speech acts makes it challenging to develop a comprehensive theory, mainly due to two key factors.

Firstly, there are numerous types of speech acts, each with a wide range of possible indirect realizations. Therefore, any theory must be broad enough to accommodate this variety.

Secondly, indirect speech act forms can vary significantly, ranging from highly conventionalized to seemingly spontaneous forms.

It seems that a single, straightforward set of generalizations is insufficient to fully capture the intricacies of indirect speech acts. (Searle, 1975), So we will try to present some ways to deal with indirect speech act.

2. Indirect speech Act

Even when speaking indirectly, listeners always attempt to comprehend the intentions of the speakers. According to Searle (1975), an indirect speech act occurs when the sentence's stated utterance differs from what was intended. These occur more frequently when speakers make requests, which are speech acts meant to compel the listener to take an action. So, Thus, a request is a type of imperative.

Think about the following scenarios when a speaker might ask for a glass of water:

1. Bring me some water, please.
2. Please give me a glass of water.
3. Can you hand me a glass of water?
4. Exists any water here?
5. Could you please getting me a glass of water?
6. Really, I'd like to have water.
7. I was wondering whether you can get me a glass of water.
8. Could you get me a glass of water?
9. You know, I really want a glass of water.
10. I am too thirsty.

Each of the ten sentences could be used by a speaker to ask for a drink of water in a specific situation.

There is no ambiguity regarding the meaning of (1) and (2) because they are written as explicit commands that are designed as direct requests.

But there are several other kinds of indirect requests, from (3) through (10).

Some of them, such as (3), are used so frequently that they hardly seem at all indirect. However, if you take (3) literally, the message should be understood to mean: Can you get me a drink of water? Because a simple "yes" or "no" response would probably not fulfill the speaker's goals and would even annoy them,

we can assume that this is not what they intended.

Similar to (3), (4) makes a request for water rather than merely enquiring as to whether the listener has any.

Although sentences (5) through (8) are likewise quite typical, (9) and especially (10) are much less straightforward.

In this case, we can see how indirect requests vary along a conventionality scale. Many indirect requests are so routine that we scarcely even notice

them. whereas other, less common ones demand more nuanced considerations of

the environment and the relationship between the speaker and listener, register them as indirect requests. (Gibbs, 1986).

3. Searle's Speech Acts and ISAs

The speaker's intended meaning is known as the illocutionary force, and Searle claims that an ISA conveys "two illocutionary forces" and that "one illocutionary act is performed indirectly by means of performing another." Informing, promising, requesting, commanding, warning, and other illocutionary activities (Austin, 1962) are accomplished when uttering utterances, which is an illocutionary act. One must first comprehend how an utterance even has an illocutionary force in order to comprehend how it may have two. Linguistic convention often determines the linkages between an utterance and its illocutionary Force (Searle, 1969). For instance, interrogatives communicate questions; declarative and imperative sentences are encoded with sentence mood. Illocutionary forces are also represented in language for Searle and others.

(1) Can you tell me your name?

(2) Your name is Anaay.

(3) Steer clear of the negative influences of the force!

(4) a. I caution you that Anaay may succumb to the dark side of the force.

(4) b. I assure you that I will provide training to shape Anaay into a Jedi knight.

When we categorize various illocutionary activities and develop a theory that links linguistic forms to these acts, as we have done with the examples given, the idea of Infelicity of Speech activities (ISA) emerges. According to the theory of alignment, an utterance exhibits an ISA when the expected illocutionary act based on the linguistic form differs from an actual illocutionary act. For instance, (1) can be categorized as an interrogative statement, The theory of alignment predicts that asking a question is an illocutionary act, but (1) is also a request, which is categorically different from asking a question.

However, it appears that the aforementioned guidelines for connecting speech acts to linguistic form give utterances (4) two illocutionary acts: they are assertions by virtue of their mood but also cautions, etc. by virtue of the verb. As a result, (4) is maybe an ISA, as Bach and Harnish (1992) claim, assuming one makes the distinction between warnings and assertions that Searle (1976) draws. We consider Searle's assertion that there are two distinct

illocutionary forces to be true. While Bach and Harnish contend that (1) is a query and Morgan contends that it is actually a request, we believe that all they demonstrate is a question.

5. It is challenging to fulfill all of the King's demands.

b. It will be challenging to respond to every question the professor poses.

c. The King will demand that the Queen comply with all of his harsh requests.

One technique to categorize a statement is using ambiguity, according to Morgan's (1975).

4. The Indirect Speech Act Problem

The relationship between speech acts and the devices used to express them is difficult because per formative verbs are scarce and a single device can perform a range of illocutionary activities.

For instance, you could use the interrogative mood to request, "Can you pass the salt?"

"Do you know the time?" was questioned.

I inquire, "Do you know that Sam got married?"

The warning was shouted, "Did you see the bear behind you?"

It is a pledge to say, "Would I miss your party?"

According to various studies, including Searle (1975), Morgan (1977), and Morgan (1978), a term can be used to express both its literal and indirect meanings. For instance, saying "it's cold here" can be interpreted as a subconscious command to close the window.

(1) A desires to perform ACT.

(2) B is capable of performing ACT.

(3) B is willing to perform ACT.

(4) B will only perform ACT if requested to do so.

They suggest that a request can be conveyed by satisfying a speaker-based sincerity condition (condition 1) or by addressing hearer-based sincerity conditions (conditions 2-4). However, the assumption for indirect requests fails to explain why certain utterances, such as 2.3a and 2.3b, are interpreted as requests:

(2.3a) Is the salt near you?

(2.3b) John asked me to ask you to pass the salt.

This assumption merely connects the literal form of one speech act to the indirect form of another without commenting on the reasons why specific acts allowed specific indirect forms. For instance, it doesn't explain why 2.3c-d can be interpreted as requests but 2.3e-f cannot. Utterance 2.3e is infelicitous as a literal query because there is no context in which one might ask a question regarding their own mental state. Despite being a valid query, utterance 2.3f does not help the speaker in his or her search for the salt. A theory of indirect speech acts should be able to explain these results.

(2.3c) Please give me the salt.

(2.3d) Would you like to pass the salt, please?

(2.3e) Am I wishing for the salt?

(2.3f) Does Jack want to pass the salt?

By communicating to the listener their desire for the act's illocutionary result and intending for the listener to understand this desire, a speaker might indirectly inform or request. Our approach expands on Searle's (1975) paradigm by isolating the definitions of illocutionary actions from the surface form criteria and adding a middle level known as surface acts.

5. Indirect Speech Acts and Conversational Implicatures

You can get the same result by saying something like, "You are standing on my foot," which has the same impact as asking someone to move. A query like "Can you reach the salt?" will accomplish the same result as a request for the salt. There appear to be an infinite amount of such indirect ways to get people off your foot or to pass the salt, therefore these are not "conventionalized" requests. They are "indirect" demands, according to Searle, which are statements that successfully make requests by taking on a different literal or socially acceptable meaning. "Con conversationally implicating" or "implying the demands" is how Grice characterizes the utterances that are literally statements or queries. Searle and Grice both

As much as your other current goals will allow, tailor your conversational contribution to the interaction's acknowledged goal or direction. The cooperative principle refers to this. (This version of the principle has been slightly adjusted to accommodate for particular conversational circumstances, such as trial testimony, when objectives like avoiding jail time may restrict the level of collaboration that characterizes a witness's comments. Note that the concept would encompass just about every cooperative activity if the word "conversational" were removed.) The scaffolding or invisible glue that turns random utterances into a cohesive conversation is called a conversational implicature. p. 61–63) of Searle's 1975 interpretation of the conversation

A: Let's go to the movies tonight.

B: I have to study for an exam.

The assumption that B's statement is cooperative and hence meaningful (based also on knowledge of the world, how long movies and studies last, etc.) is what allows A to interpret B's speech as an indirect rejection of A's claim. (Searle's, 1975, p. 73–74) of the unclear request Deliver the salt, please. A crucial aspect of Searle's analysis is the participants' understanding of the connection between necessary conditions, such as the ability to pass salt (asked in the question, "Can you pass the salt") and the intention to get salt (stated in the indirect act, "I want you to pass the salt"). The technical terminology "preparatory conditions" for the first type of precondition and "sincerity conditions" for the second are not very pertinent. Grice refers to them as quantity, quality, and relationship.

Manner: Make your contribution easy to understand given the state of knowledge of the hearer."

Once more, the uses for the taxonomy are more interesting than the taxonomy itself. Grice notes that the flagrant disregard of one or more of these maxims or rules gives rise to the meaning of some expressions. In other words, their exact meaning is obviously false, meaningless, or some other thing. Many of these statements fall into one of the traditional rhetorical categories, such as ironic, sarcastic, or metaphorical statements. (1975, Grice, p. 52). For instance, Grice (1975, p. 53) claims that the reason a statement like "You're a fine friend" has its intended effect is because the hearer is aware that the speaker must be intending the exact opposite of what they are saying. (But why the opposite?) Using metaphors like "You are the cream of the crop"

6. How to Overcome the Problems of Indirect Speech Act:

To avoid mistakes in understanding Indirect Speech Act, the listener should take into consideration many points:

6.1. Speaker Meaning and Recognition the Intention

As suggested by Searle in 1969, a lot of academics have recognized the link between speaker meaning and the impression of purpose. The idea of speaker meaning can be explained as follows: When we say, "S meant something by x," we are essentially saying, "S intended the utterance of X to have a certain effect on the audience through the recognition of this intention." To put it another way, if I throw a coin out the window in the hopes that a thief will grab it, I'm not necessarily trying to get their attention that I want them to leave. Successful communication requires that the other party at the very least acknowledge my intention for them to go. The same rule holds true for illocutionary.

6.2. Plan Inference and Indirect Speech Acts

In the current understanding of plans including speech acts, there are two separate levels: the surface level and the illocutionary level. Acts that are only visible on the surface take the shape of remarks that overtly use illocutionary force. The underlying goals that underpin utterances are taken into account by acts at the illocutionary level, regardless of the specific syntactic structures used to describe those intents.

The first act of illocutionary discourse consists of a speaker notifying a listener that a certain statement is true. For A to properly inform S that P is true, A must have the conviction that A knows P to be true and the willingness to share this knowledge with S (preconditions). Additionally, A must intend to ensure S. This is accomplished by creating a plan that makes it easier for S to recognize this goal. Then, for the effect to happen, A must rely on S: S must choose to accept what A claimed as true. The introduction of the somewhat oversimplified verb DECIDE makes this clear. Agents frequently consider INFORM acts to be.

We get around that defining the INFORMIF act presents a challenge, as it offers an alternative perspective on the INFORM speech act. The goal of a request is to prompt the hearer to desire to perform an action. This is achieved by convincing the hearer that the speaker wants them to take the action and then relying on the hearer to make the decision to do it. In order to explicitly represent this decision-making process, a CAUSE TO WANT act, similar to the DECIDE TO BELIEVE act, is necessary.

To illustrate the use of speech actions, let's examine the examples "Tell me whether the train is here" and "Is the train here?" When viewed literally, both statements are REQUESTs from A to S asking S to INFORMIF whether the train has arrived. On the other hand, the query "When does the train arrive?" is a REQUEST from A to H asking H to INFORMREF regarding the time the train is due to depart. Finally, we suggest two surface level acts: S.INFORM, which creates utterances with an indicative mood, and S.REQUEST, which creates utterances with an imperative or interrogative mood when used to request an INFORM.

Let's look at the examples "Tell me whether the train is here" and "Is it here yet?" to see how speech actions are used.

6.3. Recognizing Elocutionary Force

By saying x to S , A intended for S to understand (and be able to understand) two things: (1) that x is a manifestation of a surface act SA , and (2) that A intended for S to infer (using the PI rules and associated heuristics) from A 's execution of SA that A desires to achieve the effects of IA . This is known as an illocutionary act. This definition supports the performance of several illocutionary actions utilizing a single surface act. In this part, we demonstrate how the listener may deduce the speaker's intended meaning(s) from the speech act, especially when these intentions are subtly communicated.

6.4. Plan Inference

In order for the hearer to draw inferences from our analysis of indirect REQUESTs and INFORMs, they must be able to understand some of the speaker's goals and the measures they are taking to achieve them. Section the structure of the worldviews that language users are expected to hold, particularly their worldviews (and those of other agents) and objectives. We describe behaviors and examine how they impact the belief system.

6.5. Beliefs, Knowledge, wanting and Goals

Each agent, denoted by the letter S , is assumed to have a set of beliefs about the world, some of which may be beliefs about the beliefs held by other agents. It's crucial to remember that agents are capable of having incorrect beliefs. Quine (1956) noted that the context that belief provides may prevent the substitution of referential expressions from maintaining truth-value. There are several meanings for the word "know" in the English language. It is possible to determine whether a statement P is true, whether it is true, or what

a description's referent is. We consider $P \text{ BA}(P)$ to define "A knows that P," denoted as $\text{KNOW}(A, P)$. Compared to certain philosophical definitions of "know," where knowing implies that

Unfortunately, the weaker version of $(P \text{ BA}(P))$, i.e., $\text{KNOW}(A, P) \supset P \text{ BA}(P)$, more accurately expresses the phrase "A does not know that P" than the stronger version of $(P \text{ BA}(P))$. In other words, if S believes that A doesn't know P, then S must also believe that P is true and that A doesn't believe that P is true. This problem is analogous to the wide/narrow scope contrast discussed in Russell's account of definite descriptions (Russell, 1919). We define $W(A, P)$ as "agent A wants P to be true." $WA(P)$ is frequently used to shorten this definition. P in this context can signify either an actual state or an action taking place. If ACT is an activity in the latter case, $WA(\text{ACT}(b))$ indicates that "A desires that b perform." other's capacity to act and perceive other people's actions. (Quine 1956).

7. Actions and Plans

The methods by which the condition of the world is changed are actions. Actions can be categorized into groups or families that are represented by action schemas, much like the operators in the STRIPS planning system (Fikes and Grosz, 1990). These schemas can be thought of as procedure definitions with parameters. A name, a set of parameters with corresponding restrictions, and a collection of labeled formulae belonging to the following categories make up an action schema.

1. Effects: These are circumstances that materialize as a result of the procedure being carried out.
2. Body: During the course of the procedure, a collection of partially ordered target states must be attained. There will only ever be one goal state in the body of the examples given.
3. Preconditions: These are prerequisites that must be met in order for the procedure to be carried out successfully. We add a want precondition, which states that the agent must want to carry out the action, for voluntary acts. To put it another way, the agent must desire that the other prerequisites be met and that the effects materialize through the achievement of the body. Type restrictions and essential dependencies between parameters are examples of the limits on the parameters. Each move

The preconditions, effects, and body offer information to the planning and inference processes in the context of the blocks world (an example scenario). This makes it possible to evaluate the suitability and effects of taking the action in a particular situation. The actions that must be taken while carrying out the action are specified in the action's body. Primitive acts lack bodies, and the way they are carried out is determined by a non-examinable process. All agents are presumed to think that acts have effects and necessitate the fulfillment of their prerequisites. (Quine, 1956).

8. Plan Construction

By devising and carrying out a plan that changes the existing condition of the world into one where the aim is accomplished, an agent can achieve a desired goal. This is done by locating an operator that, if used in a specific world, would achieve the desired result. The planning procedure is finished if the operator's prerequisites are satisfied in the first world.

The planning process makes an effort to satisfy the preconditions, albeit, if they are not met. By taking into account various levels of detail in modeling the world and operators, this streamlined method of plan generation, referred to as "backward chaining," can be improved.

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We assume that an agent cannot act without wanting to do so. Therefore, the belief $WA(ACT(A))$, showing the agent's desire to carry out the action, is a prerequisite for every action carried out by an agent. We are interested in how agents create plans and make conclusions about one another, characterizing these processes as chains of logical inferences based on objectives and observable behavior. Schemas containing rules that suggest including particular states or actions in an evolving plan are used to explain these processes. The plausibility of these proposals is subsequently assessed using rating heuristics, taking the conclusions of the inferences into account. It is crucial to remember that these principles for plan construction and inference should not be taken as legitimate logical inference rules. (Quine, 1956).

Conclusion

The idea of indirect speech acts and how they are used in regular communication are the main topics of this essay. It examines the justifications for adopting indirect methods and comes to the conclusion that speakers frequently use them to incite debates or deliver unfavorable information in a less explicit or direct way. Indirectness is now a crucial component of our communication. The argument in the study supports a rationality-based explanation of indirect speech acts, including plan building and inference. It also looks at how surface speaking acts and the motivations behind them relate, as well as the various ways that the same intents might be expressed. The overall explanation of indirect speech and the suggested remedy should be distinguished even though the recommended solution may appear complex.

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As the operator definitions employed in the paper have limited expressive power and are unable to handle complex actions incorporating sequencing, conditionals, and other aspects, formalizing actions also presents difficulties. They also fail to effectively record the agent's knowledge following the accomplishment or failure of an act. In order to provide light on each of these topics, the paper's overall goal is to show how logic, philosophy of language, linguistics, and artificial intelligence interact in a useful way.

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