Comparative Semantic Analysis of the Concepts of *Kufr* (Disbelief) and *Shirk* (Polytheism) in the Holy Qur’an: A Study in Contextual Development

Abstract

This study seeks to uncover the semantic structure of the concepts of *kufr* (disbelief) and *shirk* (polytheism) in the Holy Qur’an through a comparative analytical approach that traces the trajectory of their contextual development between the Meccan and Medinan phases. The study proceeds from the fundamental hypothesis that—despite their overlap in certain doctrinal significations—the two concepts are distinguished by different functional boundaries and fields of usage, which the Qur’anic context and the diversity of discourse between the initial call (da‘wah) and the construction of the Islamic community bring to light. The research adopts a descriptive-analytical method based on an exhaustive survey of the occurrences of the two terms in the Qur’anic text, an examination of the elements of conceptual co-occurrence (collocation), and their correlation with linguistic and rhetorical data, alongside a comparative method that allows for the identification of qualitative differences between *kufr* and *shirk* in light of exegetical works, lexicography, and the Qur’anic sciences. The findings show that *kufr* is broader in meaning than *shirk*, encompassing forms of doctrinal denial such as rejection of prophethood or the Hereafter, whereas *shirk* predominantly refers to devotional and behavioural deviation associated with ascribing a partner to God in worship or obedience. It also becomes evident that *kufr* is opposed by *īmān* (faith) or *islām* (submission), while *shirk* is opposed by *tawḥīd* (monotheism) as the unifying doctrinal foundation. The study concludes that there is a noticeable development in the Qur’anic discourse concerning the two concepts between the Meccan and Medinan periods, both in terms of the intensity of reproach and in terms of their connection to legal rulings (aḥkām) and the political boundaries of the nascent Islamic society. Moreover, commonalities between the two concepts are identified, particularly with regard to the nullification of deeds, eschatological punishment, and the juristic ruling concerning the combat against the two groups when the prescribed conditions are met.